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The dcfcndant hired a horse of the plaintiff on Sunday to go on that day to tile
town of S. Ile went several miles beyond, and while doing so caused the death
of the horse by overdriving. IHdd, in an action of trover joined with case, that
the plaintiff could rccover, notwithstanding the statute prohibition of all secular
Iniiness on Sunday.
And it seems that he could equally recover for an injury to the horse by the
wronglul act of the defendant, within the limits for which he was hired.
The distinction is between wrongful acts which constitute a mere breach of the
contratt, requiring on the part of tle plaintiff the proof of the contract as an
essential part of his case, and wrongful acts that are independent of the contract
and toward which the contract stands in a mere incidental relation.

CASE, and trover; brought to the City Court of the city of Wateqbury, and tried to the jury on the general issue. Verdict for defendant, and motion to the Superior Court for a new trial, for
error in the charge of the court, which motion was reserved by the
latter court for the advice of this court. The case is fully stated in
the opinion.
O'Neil, with whom was Brebster, in support of the motion.
ff. B. Munson, contra.
CARPENTER, J.-The defendant hired a horse of the plaintiff to
drive from Waterbury to Southington on Sunday. He drove or
permitted others to drive, the horse some ten miles beyond Southington. The weather was excessively hot, and it is claimed that
the extra distance, coupled with immoderate driving, caused the
horse's death. This action, trover and case joined, is brought to
recover the value of the horse.
The court instructed the jury "that if the owner of a horse
knowingly lets him on the Lord's Day, to be driven to a particular
place, but not for any purpose of necessity or charity, and the hirer
injures the horse by immoderate driving, in consequence of which
he afterwards (lies, the owner cannot maintain an action against
the hirer fior such injury, although it occurs while going to a differet place, and beyond the limits specified in the contract." The
jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff moved
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for a new trial. . The Superior Court reserved the case for our
advice.
The court in its charge was governed by the case of Gregy v.
Wyman, 4 Cush. 822. In Maine and New Hampshire the doctrine of that case is repudiated, and the law is declared to be otherwise. 31"orton v. Gloster, 46 Maine 420; Woodman v. Hubbard,
5 Foster, 67. In Whelden v. Chappel, 8 R. Isl. 230, the court
followed Gregg v. Wyman. But in a late case, which has come
to our knowledge since this case was decided, Hall v. Coreoran,
107 Mass. 25"1, Gregg v. Wyman is expressly overruled. In
that case the defendants hired a horse and sleigh on Sunday to
drive from South Adams to North Adams for pleasure, the plaintiff knowing the purpose for which the team was hired. After
reaching North Adams they drove to Clarksbury, and on their return the horse and sleigh were injured. The court held unanimously, granting a new trial, that the defendants were liable.
Mr. Justice GRAY, in giving the opinion of the court, says : " It
therefore appears to us to be clear, upon principle and authority,
that an action of tort for the conversion of the horse by driving it
beyond the place agreed in the illegal contract of letting and hiring, is not founded on that contract. And we think it is equally
clear that that contract need not be shown by the plaintiff, and
forms no part of his cause of action."

Thus it will be seen that

the law of Massachusetts on this subject is now in substantial harmony with the law of Maine and New Hampshire. We think that
the law of this state ought to be, and is, the same. The charge
of the court therefore, that the defendant was not liable, although
the injury occurred in going to a different place, and beyond the
limits specified in the contract, was clearly erroneous. We understand the rule to be this :-the plaintiff cannot recover whenever
it is necessary for him to prove, as a part of his cause of action,
his own illegal contract, or other illegal transaction; but if he can
show a complete cause of action without being obliged to prove his.
own illegal act, although such illegal act may incidentally appear,
and nray be important even as explanatory of other facts in the
case, he may recover. It is sufficient if his cause of action is not
essentially founded upon something which is illegal. If it is, whatever may be the form of the action, he cannot recover. Apply
that rule to this case. It was only necessary for the plaintiff to
prove his own title to the property, and a conversion by the defend-
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ant. The destruction of the horse was a conversion; and proof
that thc injury which caused his death occurred while being driven
without the consent of the owner, shows a complete cause of action without any reference to an illegal contact.
The illegal letting may or may not appear. If it does, it simply exphins the defendant's possession, and proves that it was by
the owner's permission, at least for a. certain purpose. It may give
the defendant an opportunity to injure the horse, but it does not
cause the injury; nor does it contribute to it in such a sense as to
make the plaintiff a party to the wrongful act. If it does not appear, before the defendant can avail himself of it as a defence, it
becomes necessary for him to prove the illegal contract to which
he was a party, and his own illegal conduct in travelling upon the
Sabbath. But he can no more avail himself of that as a defence
than the plaintiff can as a cause of action. Either party, whose
success depends upon proving his own violation of law, must fail.
As the charge to the jury was manifestly in conflict with these
principles, the Superior Court must be advised to grant a new
trial.
Perhaps we might with propriety stop here. But there is
another question involved in the case which may be important in
another trial. It seems that the court excluded evidence of improper driving in going to, and beyond, the place specified in the
contract. We have just seen that the defendant is clearly liable
for the latter. It becomes an interesting inquiry how far he is
liable for the former.
In Jlray v. Poster, 1 Allen 408, it was held that the defendant
in a similar case was not liable, on the ground that the immoderate
driving was virtually a breach of his contract. In Weleh v. TWesson, 6 Gray 505, it was held that the plaintiff might recover for
an injury (lone to his property, while he and the defendant were
engaged in trotting horses for money contrary to statute. The
distinction between the two cases seems to be, that in the former
there was a bailment, and the misfeasance of the defendant was a
breach of hisduty as bailee; while in the latter, the act of the defendant in running the plaintiff down was a wrongful act, independent of any contract. It seems to us that the difference between
the two cases is more apparent than real. No express contract
was violated in either case. An implied contract therefore must
be relied upon; and there seems to be quite as much reason for
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Baying that the defendant in one case agreed to act fairly in the
.race, as that the defendant in the other agreed to drive the horse
properly. Strictly speaking it was not a matter of actual agreement in either case. In each case the act of the defendant was a
violation of a duty imposed by law; in the one, a duty of universal
obligation, to do his neighbor no wrong ; in the other, a specific
duty imposed by the law of bailments.
If the usual test, whether the plaintiff can prove his cause of action without proving the unlawful agreement, be applied, are not
the plaintiffs chances quite as good in the case of a bailment as in
the othep case? In one case the plaintiff proves that the defendant
wrongfully injured his horse while the parties were driving side by
side; in the other, the plaintiff proves that the defendant wrongfully injured his horse while driving him by his consent. If the
circumstances of the race are unimportant, so the nature and character of the bailment are immaterial. In each case the tort, and
not the contract, is the gist of the action.
But a determination of the precise question decided in Way
v. Foster is unnecessary in the present case. The immoderate
driving during the bailment, of itself, or in connection with the
improper driving after the bailment terminated, caused the death
of the horse. There can be no doubt that the general rule is that
an action of trover will lie in such a case, and that the plaintiff in
this case is entitled to recover, unless the letting the horse on Sunday is a bar to a recovery. In each of two cases cited above,
Woodman v. Hubbard, 5 Foster 67, and Hall v. Corcoran, 107
Mass. 251, the wrongful act which resulted in the death of the
horse occurred after the bailment had terminated; but much of the
reasoning of the court applies as well to a destruction during the
bailment, as to a destruction afterwards. In the latter case, the
court carefully avoids overruling Way v. Poster, and suggests the
only distinction by which the two cases can be reconciled, and that
is the difference between an action of tort in the nature of an action of trover, and an action of tort for abusing the horse while
driving to the place for which he was hired.
On the whole we regard the cases cited above as authorities for
holding that a party who hires and drives a horse upon the Sabbath,
and, while so driving it, causes its death, either wilfully or negligently, is liable to the owner in an action of trover. We think
also that the law thus stated can be fully vindicated upon principle
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The plaintiff, in making a contract prohibited, by law, exposed
himself to all its legitimate consequences. lie is not only liable
to the penalty, but the law will refuse to aid him in enforcing it,
or in recoverilng compensation for a breach of it, and will not allow
him to recover in any action which essentially depends upon it.
Blut it does not, in a case like this, deprive the owner of his general property in the horse, nor place him, or his property, outside of
the protection of the law. Nor will it in any sense operate to justify or excuse the other party in the commission of any wrongful
act not contemplated by the agreement. Now it must be conceded
that an action of trover'is not founded upon a contract. None is
referred to in the declaration, and none need be proved on the trial.
All that the plaintiff is required to prove is title in himself, and a
conversion by the defendant. In this case the title is not in
dispute. And when the plaintiff proves that the defendant was
driviiig his horse from Waterbury to Southington, and that while
doing so he wilfully or negligently drove him in such a manner as
to cause his death, is not his case fully proved ? It is quite immaterial how the horse came to be in the defendant's possession.
Whether lawfully or unlawfully is not of the slightest consequence.
Ile may have found him in the highway; lie may have hired him
of a stranger; he may have taken him from the plaintiff's stable,
with or without leave, upon a week day, or upon the Sabbath ; it
is all the same. The plaintiff is bound to offer no proof on the
subject. If the defendant would derive any benefit from the illegal
contract he is the one to prove it ; and when he attempts to do so,
he is met with the objection that lie cannot avail himself of an
illegal transaction in which lie participated as a defence to the
action.
For these reasons we are of the opinion that it was competent
for the plaintiff to prove the misconduct of the defendant both before and after reaching Southington ; and that if either, or both,
caused the death of the horse, the plaintiff is entitled to recover.
A new trial is advised.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The ground of this decision seems
most unquestionable, and we trust the
time will soon come, when the courts
will be able, in all the states, to compre-

hend that there is nothing so specially
sncred in the time of the Lord's Day, or
Christian Sabbath, as it is popularly
called, as to require them to adopt con-
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structions of unusual strictness and severity, in order to secure the observance
of a kind of Jewish Sabbath upon that
day. We ought not, perhaps, to object
to the existence of such a feeling among
the more rigorous adherents to the religious doctrines of the Puritans, since
that is about all which remains to assure
us of the former existence of a more vigorous religious sentiment, in our country, than now exists in any portion of it.
But as this special zeal in favor of maintaining a close analogy to the observance of the Jewish Sabbath, among
Christians, confessedly arose from a misconception or perversion of the appropriate character of the Lord's Day as
practised from the earliest ages of the
Church, we have never favored it. And
possibly that feeling may have led us,
in some casds, to adopt constructions too
favorable towards the escape from the
penalties of the Sunday laws: Adams v.
Gay, 19 Vt. 358, where our views upon
this question will be found more in detail than we should care to repeat here.
The propositions maintained in that case
have never failed to meet the approbation of the profession, so far as their
justice and policy extended. But it has
sometimes been doubted, -whether they
are all entirely consistent with the nature of our penal enactments to enforce
the observance of Sunday, as a day of
religious devotion. The 'opinion, in that
case, is based largely upon the English
cases, which have special reference, of
course, to the spirit and intention of the
English statute, which was, to compel
persons to abstain from their ordinary
secular pursuits, and rest, at least, on
the Lord's Day. We supposed the Vermont statute based upon the same principle. It is certain that is so, in most
of the statutes of the New England
states. Upon that principle we attempted, upon the authority of Blxome v.
Williams, 3 B. & C. 232, to maintain

that the statute only rendered contracts
made on Sunday illegal, so fair as what
was done upon Sunday towards their consummation, and that if they were acrtially and finally consummated upon some
other day, they could not be avoide
upon the ground of any general illegality attaching to all that was done
upon Sunday towards laying the foundation or inception of any such contracts.
Upon thi i ground we have maintained
that all done upon Sunday, of the nature
of secular business, is to be regarded as
simply void and inoperative, the same
as if it had never been done. But if at
some after time sufficient passes between
the parties to constitute in itself a valid
contract, it is none the less binding because the parties had done something
else in regard to the same subject-matter which the law would not recognise
as valid. This would enable one who
had sold his horse upon Sunday, for a
given price, but received no pay, to reclaim the animal upon any other day,
by demanding its restoration, or payment of the price, and the refusal to restore it might then be treated as a co,firmation of the contract, the same as if a
note were executed upon a week-day for a
consideration passing on Sunday: /nrejoy v. Whipple, 18 Vt. 379. But the
extreme view of some of the cases, thut
if one lent or hired his horse upon Sunday he could not recover even for the
actual tort of the bailee, as in Greg v.
Wyman, 6 Cush. 322, seems quite in the
opposite extreme. The tendency now
evidently is, to adopt a reasonable if not
a mild construction of the penal law-,
intended to secure the due observance of
the Lord's Day, and we are satisfied the
purpose will be most likely to be secured in this mode. There can be no
question of the entire soundness of the
decision in the principal case.
I. F. E.
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
GLENDON IRON CO. v. UIILER

ET AL.

The ,lame of an incorporated town or borough cannot be employed as a trademark even if adoptedt and used as such prior to its use in a geographical sense.

Tats was a bill in equity to enjoin the use of the word " Glendon" by the defendants upon iron of their manufacture, on the
ground that it had been previously acquired as a trade-mark by
the complainants.
The opinion of tile court was delivered by
IMLRCUR, J.-Glendon is the name of the town in which the
bnsiness of each party is located and carried on. It is an incorporated borough. Being, then, the name of an incorporated town,
the main question is whether the appellant lawfully has the exclusive right to use it as a trade-mark. It is conceded, as a general
rule, that the name of a town or city cannot be so appropriated as
the exclusive property of any one This view is well sustained by
authority: high on Injunctions, sec. 673; Bispham's Eq. 411;
lVolfe v. LGoulrd, 18 Howard's Prac. Rlep. 64; Brooklyn White
Lead Co. v. llasuryj, 25 Barb. 416; Newman v. Alvord, 49 Barb.
538 ; G'andee v. Deere, Supreme Court of Illinois, 10 Am. Law
RTeg. N. S. 694 ; Del.
ud. Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wallace 331.
It is contended by the appellant that this case is taken out of
the general rule, inasmuch as the trade-mark was adopted prior to
the incorporation of the borough, and before there was any town in
that place. No authority is cited which supports this distinction.
The case of WTrotherspoon v. Currie, L. R. 5 H. of Lords 519, is
clearly distinguishable. It is known as the Glenfield Starch Case.
It is true the injunction was there granted, but the complainiant
and respondent were not both engaged in carrying on the same
business in the same town or city.

There iras no town nor city

there. The Lord Chancellor says: "Glenfield is not a town,
* * * * it is not a parish, it is not a hamlet, it is not a district
of any special character, but it was an estate of that name upon
which some people seem to have erected some houses or manufactories, and upon which now some sixty people are living." It
will not do to apply to an incorporated borough in this state, the
same rule that may be applicable to an estate in England. Such
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a borough is essentially of a public nature, the est;te is of a mere
private character. The name which an individual may give to his
estate is unlike that which legislative sanction has given to a municipal corporation. The right of the public in each is radically
different. The appellees did not falsely represent the place of
.their business location. Their pig iron was actually manufactured
within the borough of Glendon.
It is said'in Canal Co. v. Clark, supra, "True it may be that
the use by a second producer in describing truthfully his products
by a name or combination of words already in use by another,
may have the effect of causing the public to mistake as to the
origin or ownership of the product, but if it is just as true in its
application to his goods as it is to those of another who first applied it, and who therefore claims an exclusive right to use it,
there is no legal or moral wrong done. Purchasers may be mistaken but they are not deceived by false representations, and equity
will not enjoin against telling the truth." The appellees put upon
their pigs the initials of their firm and the name of their town.
That name was Glendon to the whole world. It cannot be that
the previous appropriation by the appellant of the word which now
is the name of the town, prevents any other manufacturer of pig
iron, within its limits, from using the same word. If it be so now,
it may continue through all comingtime. The boundaries of the
town may be enlarged; the borough may grow into a city; the
manufactories of pig iron may be multiplied, yet the word most
expressive to indicate their locations must be denied to all save
one. So far as the authorities go to restrain a manufacturer from
the adoption of a truthful trade-mark, we will endeavor to enforce
them. When asked to go further we must decline. If the effect
of the incorporation of the appellants' district of country into a town
by the name of.' Glendon' has been to deprive them of some of
their former rights, they must submit to the consequences. As
well might they complain of the increased taxation which the municipal corporation has probably imposed upon their property.
By-the creation of this new municipality they assumed new relative rights. They relinquished some which they previously possessed. The rights thereby given to the public became common
to all citizens dwelling therein.
We see nothing in the facts of this case, even as found by the
master, to take it out of the teneral rule, which denies to one the
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exclusive use, as a trade-mark, of the name of the town in which
the same kind of goods are manufactured by others. The commission of a lawful act does not become actionable although it may
proceed from a malicious motive: Jenkins v. Fowler, 12 Harris
308; 4 Casey 176. This view is decisive of the case. We will,
however, add that an examination of the evidence has, in one respect, led us to a different conclusion from the one arrived at by
the master. We are unable to discover satisfactory proof that the
-appellees adopted their trade-mark with the design of imitating the
one used by the appellants. The learned judge was entirely correct in dismissing the bill.
Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at costs of the appellant.
The point, decided in this case, that a
name of a geographical nature cannot be
protected as a trade-mark even if adopted and used as such prior to its having a
geographical meaning, has never before
been considered by an English or American court. It is of no inconsiderable
consequence, involving, as it does, the
fundamental principles upon which the
validity of trade-marks depends.
That the opinion is unsound will be
scarcely doubted, when its logic and
effect are critically examined.
It is admitted by the court that the
plaintiff was the owner of a lawful trademark prior to the incorporation of the
borough; but it is said that the act of
incorporation divested his ownership in
his mark and transformed the mark into
a public right in which every inhabitant
of the new borough was entitled to participate. That the plaintiff was in the
rightful enjoyment of his mark at the
time of the incorporation of the borough
is not questioned, nor is it mooted that
he was in any manner estopped to assert his right. The decision is an unqualified announcement of the doctrine
that a trade-mark consisting of a word
may be invalidated by its adoption as
the name of a town.
It is settled law that a trade-mark is
property in the usual legal acceptation
of the term.
VOL. XXII.-36

The authorities to this effect are numemerous and weighty. Says the Lord
Chancellor in Leather Cloth Co. v. Ant.
Leather Cloth Co., 11 Jur. N. S. 513:
"It is correct to say that there is no ex-i
elusive ownership of the symbols which
constitute a trade-mark apart from the
us; or application of them ; but the word
'trade-mark' is the designation of marks
or symbols when applied to a vendible
commodity, and the exclusive right to make
such use or application is rightly called
property. The true principle seems to
he that the jurisdiction of the court rests
upon property. ' 2
In MlcAndrew v. Bassett, 10 Jur. N.
S. 550, the following language is used -.
"Now Iam by no means driven to the
Tlecessity of determining when, for the
first time, property may be said to be established in a trade-mark. * * * The
essential elements for constituting that
property probably would be found to be
no other than these: First, that the
mark has been applied by the plaintiffs
properly-that is to say, that they have
not copied any other person's mark, and
that the mark does not involve any false
representation ; secondly, that the article so marked is actually a vendible article in the market," &c.
"A. trade-mark is property, and the
proprietor thereof should be fully protected in its enjoyment: VAN Vonst,
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J., Supreme Court of New York, 2 Daly
212.
"The object or purpose of the law in
protecting trade-marks as property is
two-fold :" CARPENTER, J., Supreme
Court of Connecticutt 35 Conn. 402.
"The court interferes to protect the
plaintiff, * * * because it (the trademark) is his property-"" FOLGER, J.,
Court of Appeals of New York, Am. T.
M. Cases 626.
"The plaintiffs have adopted, appropriated and used a certain trade-mark.
This has become their property:" DAvIEs, C. J., Court of Appeals of New
York, 3 Keyes 594.
"1It is now, therefore, the well-established doctrine that the exclusive property
of the manufacturer * * * in his trademarks is of that nature, * * * that its
protection by * * * the courts is an imperative duty :" Upton on Trade-marks
13; Browne on Trade-marks 32 e seq.
Authorities to the above effect might
be multiplied to include nearly the whole
body of the law upon the subject.
If, then, a trade-mark is property it
would seem to be manifest that the right
to its epjoyment can only be affected by
the operation of the same causes that
control the title to property of other
kinds.
Had the act of incorporation in the
principal case provided that all the
iron in the possession of the plaintiff
at the time of its passage was the property of the borough; the provision would
have been without any legal effect
if
whatever. The word "Glendon,"
it was a trade-mark, as is undisputed,
was as much his property, for the purpose for which it was employed, as the
iron upon which it was impressed. Why,
therefore, was not the act of incorporation of as little effect with respect to the
latter as it might have been in respect to
the former description of property? The
decision of the learned judge is that to all
intents and purposes the act declared

that private property was public property, and that the mere declaration worked
a lawful alienation and change of title.
The effect of the decision before us
may be happily illustrated by a practical
application of its doctrines.
The Court of Appeals of New York has
held that the words "1Congress Spring
Water" could be protected upon the
ground that the parties using the same
were the proprietors and bottlers of the
only spring from which Congress
Spring Water could be obtained. Let
us suppose that certain individuals residing near an obscure spring in Virginia procure the incorporation of a village, the corporate limits of which
include such spring, by the name of
Congress Spring. It cannot be doubted
that any ordinary use of the name of
such village upon mineral waters ohtained from the spring within its limits
would be at once enjoined at the suit of
the proprietors of the true Congress
Spring. It is manifest that the fact of
the name being geographical would he
wholly witlout weight. The act of incorporation could not divest the rights
of citizens of another state. Is it to be
said that the principle would be different
if a town or borough was incorporated
by the name of Congress Spring in the
state of New York?
"Anatolia"l has been pronounced a
valid trade-mark for liquorice by the
English courts. If a town or borough
was incorporated by the name of Anatolia in one of the territories of the United
States and a liquorice manufactured at
such town or borough and offered in the
English markets, it is apparent that an
English court would -not hesitate to restrain the American manufacturer upon
the obvious ground that the common-law
rights of a subject of Great Britain could
not be legislated out of existence by a
foreign power. - And yet the rights of
the subject of Great Britain would he the
same in both countries, and the name
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Anatolia as purely geoguaphical in the
House of Lords as in the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania.
The names of stations upon lines of
railroad usually become the names of
incorporated towns and cities, and are
thus inve-tcd with a geographical signification. They are generally selected
by some official of the railroad company, and the selection confirmed by use.
Under the law as laid down by the
principal case, it is practicable for an
enterprising president or superintendent
to destroy, by a judicious selection of
names, the validity of the most famous
and valuable trade.marks in existence.
Thusithe first station might be called
Lone Jack, where smoking tobacco could
be manufactured ; the second might be
called Cocoaine, where cocoaine could
be produced ; the third, Solace, where
chewing tobacco could be made; the
fourth, Monogram, where whiskey could
be distilled-and so on. If the road was

located on Long Island or in New Jersey in proximity to commercial centres,
the scheme would be very likely to succeed. The names would in the course
of events become geographical, and the
rights of the owners of the sundry trademarks be divested accordingly.
That the decision announced in the
principal case is calculated to be productive of unfortunate results seems to
be obvious, when its nature and effect are
carefully weighed. It can only be sustained upon the assumption that a trademark is not property, but an anomaly
which can be neither defined nor protected. A recognition of the simple principles upon which the ownership of trademarks rests, the principles which obtain
wherever there is a common-law ownership, would have inevitably led awa7k
from the conclusion arrived at, and toward that which comports alike with
reason and authority.
ROWLAND Cox.
Washington, D. C.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
MARGARET MARTIN

ET AL. v.

JANET ROBSON.

The statutes of Illinois having given a married woman the sole control of her
property and earnings, free from any control or interference of the husband, the
necessary operation of such statutes is to discharge the latter from any liability
for the wife's torts committed during coverture out of his presence and without
his participation.

imS was an action against husband and wife f6r slander uttered
by the latter.
The Acts of 1861 and 1869 (Sess. Laws 1861, 143, and of 1869, .
255), give to the wife during coverture, the sole control of her
separate estate and property acquired in good faith fr6m any person
other than her husband; and her own earnings for labor performed
for any person other than her husband or minor children, with the
right to use and possess the property and earnings, free from the
control or interference of her husband.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
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THORNTON, J.-Since the Acts of 1861 and 1869, is a husband liable for the torts of his wife, during coverture, committed
when he is not present, and in which he, in no manner, participates ?
In determining the intent, object and effect of these enactments,
it will be interesting to place in juxtaposition the rights and
duties, liabilities and disabilities of husband and wife incident to
the marriage union as they existed at common law, and the changes
made by the statutes.
At common law he had control almost absolute over her person;
Was entitled, as the result of the marriage, to her services and consequently to her earnings and to her goods and chattels; bad the
right to reduce her choses in action to possession during her life;
could collect and enjoy the rents and profits of her.real estate;
and thus had dominion over her property and became the arbiter
of her future.
She was in a condition of complete dependence; could not contract in her own name; was bound to obey him; and her legal
existence was merged in that of her husband, so that they were
termed and regarded as one person in law. As a necessary consequence, he was liable for the debts of the wife dum sola, and for
her torts and frauds committed during coverture. If they were
done in his presence, or by his procurement. he alone was liable;
otherwise they must be jointly sued.
Now he cannot enjoy the profits of her real estate without her
permission. He has no control over her separate personal property. It is not subject to his "disposal, control or interference."
Language could not be more explicit. All her separate property
is "under her sole control, to be held, owned, possessed and enjoyed by her, th6 same as though she was sole and unmarried."
He has no right to use or dispose of a horse or a cow without her
consent. He can no longer interfere with her choses in action.
They are under her sole control. The product of her labor is her
exclusive property. She alone can Sue for and enjoy it. Any
suit for her earnings must be in her own name, and she may use
and possess them free from the interference of her husband or his
creditors. The language of the statute of 1869 is that "a married woman shall be entitled to receive, use and possess her own
earnings, and sue for the same, in her own name, free from the
The words, "free from the interinterference of her husband."
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ference of her husband," apply as well to the right to receive, use
and possess, as to 'the right to sue for, her earnings. The right
therefore to receive and use her own earnings uncontrolled by the
husband, is conferred in express terms.
The practical enjoyment of this right presupposes the right to
appropriate her own time. The right to take and possess the
wages of labor must be accompanied with the right to labor.
If the husband can control these, the statute has conferred a
barren right. If the wife can still onlyacquire earnings with his
consent, then the statute was wholly unnecessary, for she might
have done this prior to its enactment. The clear intent of the
statute is, not alone to give to the wife the right to accept and use
her earnings, but the right to labor, and thus acquire them.
The intention of the Legislature to abrogate the common-law
rule, to a great degree, that husband and wife were one person;
and to give to the latter the right to control her own time, to
manage her separate property, and contract with reference to it,
is plainly indicated by these statutes. While they do not expressly repeal the common-law rule, that the husband is liable for
the torts of the wife, they have made such modification of his
rights and her disabilities as wholly to remove the reason for the
liability. The rights acquired by the husband by virtue of the
marriage have almost all been taken away; and the disabilities of
the wife have nearly all been removed. She now controls her
own estate entirely, except that, by construction of the courts, she
cannot convey her real estate without her husband. This, however, is solely for her protection, and to prevent the squandering
of the estate. He has now only a modified tenancy by the curtesy,
dependent upon a contingency, and no estate vests during the life
of the wife. This is rather a shadowy estate. It is an interest
which may possibly ripen into something tangible in the uncertain
future. Previous to the Act of 1861, it could be sold on execution
against the husband; now the wife has the sole control of her
real estate during her life, and the husband has no interest until
her death. She must sue alone for breach of covenant in a deed
to her. This estate, at best, is now a bare possibility: Cole v.
Iran Ripen, 44 Ill. 88; Beach v. Miller, 51 Id. 206. A liability
which has for its consideration rights conferred, should no longer
exist when the consideration has failed. If the relations of husband and wife have been so changed as to deprive him of adl right
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to her property and to the control of her person and her time,
every principle of right would be violated to hold him still responsible for her conduct. If she is emancipated, he should no longer
be enslaved.
For the policy and wisdom of the legislation which has effected
a change so radical the Legislature alone is responsible.
The courts must guard against a construction, which might
prove mischievous, and result in a practical divorcement of man
and wife, if such construction can be avoided. In Cole v. Van
Ripen, supra,this court said that the Legislature never could have
intended by the enactment of 1861 to loosen the bonds of matrimony, or to enable the wife at pleasure to effectuate a divorce a
mensa et thoro; or to confer the power to restrict the husband to
the use of a particular chair, or to forbid him to take a book from
her library without her permission. We shall not insist that such
unwife-like conduct can ever be justified since the law of 1869.
The inquiry is therefore pertinent, what is left of the nuptial contract? What duties and obligations still exist? As the result of the
marriage vow, and as a party of the contract, the wife is still bound
to love and cherish the husband, and to obey him in all reasonable
demands not inconsistent with the exercise of her legal rights, to
treat him -withrespect, and regard him at least as her equal; and
he is alike bound to protect and maintain her, unless she should
neglect wholly her marital duties, as imposed by the common law,
or assume a position to prevent their performance, and thus deprive him of her society, mar the beauty of married life, and disregard the household good. These duties and obligations upon
husband and wife were not the result of the arrangement of their
property at common law, but of the contract of marriage and the
relation thereby created. By .the marriage she became one of his
family, and he was bound to provide her a home and necessaries
there, but not elsewhere. He must furnish her with necessaries
from a principle of duty and justice: 2 Kent Com. 148. "The
duties of the wife while cohabiting with her husband, form the consideration of his liability for her necessaries :" IkcCutchen v. MeGahay, 11 John. 281. This doctrine is approved by KENT in his
Commentaries, 2 vol. 146. The argufnent urged to maintain the
responsibility of the husband for the torts of the wife, because he
may, still be bound to provide necessaries, is not appropriate.
Upon the marriage, at common law, his assent to her contracts for
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necessaries was presumed upon proof of cohabitation. If she
eloped, though not with an adulterer, the husband was not chargeable even for necessaries. But elopement did not release him
from liability for her debts dun sola, or for her torts. The
rule at common lMw as to the liability for necessaries, is that if a
man, without justifiable cause, turns away his wife, he is bound for
her contracts for necessaries suitable to her degree and estate.
If they live together, and he will not supply her, or the neces.ary
means, she then can pledge his credit for necessaries strictly; but
if he provides for her, he is not bound by her contracts, unless
there is evidence to prove his assent. He is not bound by her
contracts, unless they are made by his authority, or with his concurrence, except he makes no provision for her: fontague v.
Benedict, 3 Barn. & Cress. 631 ; Mfontague v. Espenesse, 1 Car.
& Payne 502; Atkins v. Curwood, 7 Car. & Payne 756. The
plain reason for the obligation was the cohabitation or the right
to enforce it, and the consequent right to her obedience and services. Even though she lived separate from him, supported her
children and earned a salary, the party owing her had no right
to pay her after notice from the husband not to do so. He could
in such case sue for and recover the salary: Glover v. .Proprietors
of Drury Lane, 2 Chitty 117. Now, how changed. Her earnings, except for services she may render to him and his minor
children, are her exclusive property, whether living apart from, or
with, him. No principle is better settled at common law, than
that the husband is not liable for necessaries furnished to the wife
if she leaves him without any fault on his part. But he was responsible for her torts, until a. dissolution of the marriage, even in
case of separation. Where the husband and wife lived apart and
she published a libel of a third person, he was held to be answerable, notwithstanding the separation: Head v. Briscol & Wife, 5
Car. & Payne 484. The foundation for the liability in the two
cases is different. In the one case it was based upon cohabitation
and the enjoyment of the society and services of the wife as a
necessary consequence. In the other case it rested more particularly, if not exclusively, upon the fact that the husband became
the absolute owner of her personal property, and bad the right to
receive the rents and profits of her real estate. It is also urged
as a reason for the continued liability of the husband for the torts
of the wife, that this obligation was imposed upon-him at common
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law, whether she was poor or wealthy, and that therefore the
statutes have produced no different rule. If she did not enrich
him with property, if she did not endow him with gold, she endowed him with a nobler gift, and a greater excellence. She enriched him with her society ; advised and encouraged him, as one
who had no separate interests ; and freely gave to him her time,
industry and skill. As a means of paying her debts and dainnges
for her torts, her counsel and earnings might be as important
as her accumulated property. The distinction between the liability of the husband for the contracts of the wife, before marriage, and for her torts during marriage, as for slander uttered by
her alone, is too dim to be easily seen. He was made liable for
her debts at the period of marriage, because the law gave to him
all her personal estate in possession, and the power to recover her
personal property in action: Bright's Hus. & Wife, 2d vol. p. 2.
He was bound to pay her indebtedness, because he adopted her
and her circumstances together: Blackst. B. 1, 443. The law
made him liable to the debts to which he took her subject, because
he acquired an absolute interest in her personal property; had the
receipt of the rents and profits of her real estate during coverture ;
and was entitled to whatever accrued to her by her industry or
otherwise, during the same period: Steph. Nisi Prius, Vol. 1, p.
•726. The reason for the liability, according to some authorities,
is that by the marriage, the wife was deprived of the use and dis-.
posal of her property, and could acquire none by her industry, as
her person and earnings belonged to the husband: Tyler on Infancy & Coy. sec. 216. The same author, after declaring the busband's liability for the debts and torts of the wife, says :-" The
reason assigned for such liabilities, at common law, is that he was
entitled to the rents and profits of the wife's real estate during
coverture and to the absolute dominion over her personal property in possession: sec. 233. The common law was never guilty
of the absurdity of imposing obligations so onerous without conferring corresponding rights. Hence besides the rights of property,
the legal pre eminence was exclusively vested in the husband.
He was answerable for her misbehavior, and hence had the right
of restraint over her person: 1 Black., 444.
Lord Kaimes, in his sketches, says-" The man bears rule over
his wife's person and conduct; she bears rule over his inclinations ;
he governs by law ; she by persuasion." In the matter of (Joah-
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rane, 8 Dowl. P. 0. 632, the wife was, upon the hearing of a writ
of habea# corpus, restored to her husband, upon the principle that
she was under his guardianship,. and that the law entitled him
"for the sake of both to protect her from the danger of unrestrained intercourse iith the world by enforcing cohabitation and- a
common residence." So long as the husband was entitled to tlhe
property of the wife and to her industry, so long as he had power
to direct and control her, and thus prevent her from the commission of torts, there was some reason for his liability. The reason
bas ceased. The ancient land-marks are gone. The maxims and
authorities and adjudications of the past have faded away. The
foundations hitherto deemed so essential for the preservation of
the nuptial contract, and the maintenance of the marriage relation,
are crumbling. The unity of husband and wife has been severed.
They are now distinct persons, and may have separate legal estates, contracts, debts and injuries. To this conclusion have all
the decisions of this court tended. So far as the separate personal
property of the wife is concerned,' she is now the same as a feme
sole . She need not join her husband with her in a suit to recover it, or for trespass to it, as her rights only are affected and
she must sue alone for any invasion of them. She may even prosecute a suit against her husband for any unlawful interference
with her property contrary to her wishes: -Emerson v. Clayton,
32 I1. 493. The right of action, for personal injuries to the
wife, is property; she may sue alone for the recovery of damages
for such injuries, and the husband cannot, without her consenit, release them: . B. & Q. 1B. f. Co. v. Dunn, 52 Ill. 260. In the
same case, it is said that she can maintain in her own name an action for slander of her character. If she alone is entitled to rec live and appropriate to her own use damages recovered for slander of herself, she should answr for her slander of others. Until
the. law of 1869, this court adhered to the common-law rule that
the husband was responsible for the debts of the wife contracted
before marriage. It was repeatedly declared that the liability rested
not only upon the fact that the husband, upon the marriage, became the owner of the wife's personal property when reduced to
possession, and of a life estate in her realty, but upon the ground
that he was entitled to the entire proceeds of her time and her
labor; and that notwithstanding the law of 1861, he was still entitled
to her earnings: Connerv. Berry, 46 Ill. 371 ; rcM urty v. Web-

MARTIN v; ROBSON.

ster, 48 Id. 128. The last decision was made in 1868. Then followed the law of 1869. In the first adjudication under it, it was
hold that as she now owned separate property and enjoyed her own
earnings, she must pay the costs incurred in attempting to maintain her rights : Musgrave v. Musgrave, 54 Ill. 186. In Hawanthi v. WYarmer, January Term 1871, the husband was declared
to be discharged from his former liability to pay the debts of the
wife contracted before marriage, by force of the legislation under
consideration. A married woman may now be sued at law upon
her contracts as to her separate property: Cooksen v. Toole, January Term 1871. She may now execute a valid lease of her separate real estate, without joining her husband and without his consent: Parent v. Cullerand, January Term 1872.
So diverse are the rights and interests, the duties, obligations
and disabilities of husband and wife now from what they formerly
were, that it would be most unreasonable to hold him still liable
forher torts ommitted without his presence and without his consent or approbation. If he is not bound to pay her debts, why
should he be responsible for her torts ? When the groundwork
is gone as to one it is gone as to the other, and the structure of
the past must fall before the innovations of the present. She is
now to a very great extent independent of him, and is clothed
with rights and powers-ample for her own protection; and so far
as her separate property is concerned, is responsible for her debts
and contracts with reference to it. They are not one as heretofore. They are one in name, and are bound by solemn contract,
sanctioned by both divine and human law, to mutual respect;
should be of the same household, and one in love and affection.
But a line has been drawn between them, distinct and ineffaceable, except by legislative power. His legal supremacy is gone,
and the sceptre has departed from him. She, on the contrary, can
have her separate estate; can contract with reference to it ; can
sue and be sued at law upon the contracts thus made; can sue in
her own name for injury to her person and slander of her character; and can enjoy the fruits of her time and labor, free from
the control or interference of her husband. The chains of the
past have been broken by the progression of the present, and she
may now enter upon the stern conflicts of life untrammelled.
She no longer clings to and depends upon man, but has the legal
right and aspires to battle with him in the contests of the forum;
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to outvie him in the healing art; to climb with him the steeps of
fame; and to share with him in every occupation.
Her brain and hands and tongue are her own, and she should
alone be responsible for slanders uttered by herself. Our opinion
is, that the neessary operation of the statutes is to discharge the
husband from his liability for the torts of the wife during coverture which he neither aided, advised nor countenanced.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.
SHELDON, J., dissenting.-I do not assent to the judicial repeal
of the old rule of the law that the husband is liable for the torts
of the wife committed during coverture. The assumed foundation
of the rule is not all removed yet. A part of it, to wit, that
whatever accrues to the wife by her labor belongs to the husband,
for the most part yet remains.
The act which entitles a married woman to her earnings pxpressly denies to her any right to compensation for tny labor performed for her husband or minor children. Of this description
chiefly are the services of married women. Any other are exceptional. As to the husband's right to the services of his wife
being one of the assigned reasons of his liability for her acts and
obligations, see 2 Bac. A. 88, title Baron and Feme, (F); Tyler
on Infancy and Coverture 833. But are these assumed reasons
of the husband's liability, namely his rights in the wife's property and to her labor, the sole ground of the liability? Blackstone lays it down that "1by marriage the husband and wife are.
one person in law. * * Upon this principle, of a union of person
in husband and wife, depend almost all the legal rights, duties and
disabilities that either of them acquire by the marriage." 1 Black.
Com. 441-42. "If the wife be indebted before marriage, the
husband is bound afterwards to pay the debts; for he has adopted
her and her circumstances together :" Id. 442-3. Because the
legislature has seen fit to interfere with this unity of person, so
fatr as to allow the wife the enjoyment of.her separate property
and to have her earnings to a limited extent, it does not follow that the courts should annul it in all other particulars. Were it
a question before the body whose province it is to alter the law,
re isons of public policy might suggest themselves to the legislative
mind, to let the rule making the husband answerable for his wife's
misbehavior remain undisturbed, as established in the wisdom of
the common law.
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One remedy which our law has provided for torts, is imprisonment on execution. But a wife is not liable to be imprisoned for
a private wrong without her husband: 2 Kent Coln. 149; 3 Black.
Com. 413; Reeves Dom. Relations 145. This remedy then will
be unavailing where a wife is a tortfeasor if the husband be exempted from liability.
As the acquisitions of the joint industry of husband and wife
belong to the former, we may expect it to be the exception rather
than the rule, where there will be found separate estate belonging
to the wife, to be reached by execution. This will make the
,-remedy by recovery of damages, by suit against the wife alone, of
little worth. Thus the abrogation of the law in question leaves
the party who may receive injuries at the hands of a married
woman practically remediless. It will so be, that she in most instances may commit private wrongs with legal impunity, and wives
will be made, as it were,, licensed wrongdoers. A weakening
effect will be produced in the respect of family government, which
is a powerful aid to that of the state in the maintenance of civil
order. There will no longer be the motive of pecuniary interest
on the part of the husband to induce him to exercise a salutary
influence in promoting good conduct in the wife, and in restraining her from the commission of wrongs. As bearing upon the
subject in band the following remarks of Lord Chancellor TALBOT
in the ease of Heard v. Stamford, 3 Peere Williams 410-11, are
not unworthy of 'regard:--" I do not see how anything less than
an Ac of Parliament can alter the law. * * * If the law as it
now stands be thought inconvenient, it will be a good reason for
the legislature to alter it; but till that is done, what is law at
present must take place." Enough of uncertainty is being brought
into our laws by the regularly ordained law-making power in the
exercise of its functions. The evil of the law's uncertainty is
arg"avated where the continuance of the ancient principles of the
law is made dependent on mere judicial discretion
SCOTT

and BREESE, JJ., concurred with

SHELDON, J., in his

dissent.
A consideration of the opinion of the
court in the principal case will show the
ground of the decision to he that although thQ Illinois statutes lind ,ot in

terms removed the husband's liability
for the torts of the wife committed during
coverture, yet they had so modified his
rights and removed her disabilities, that
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the reason of the rule of the husband's
liability no longer existed, and the rule
fell with its reason. In the language
above: "A liability which has for its
consideration rights conferred should no
longer exist when the consideration has
failed." The minority of the court, on
the other hand, were of the opinion that
the statutes in that state had only partially, if at all, destroyed the unity of
person between husband and wife, and
had left enough of it untouched to form
a reason for the continuance of the old
rule; and they spoke of the decision of
the court as a "judicial repeal of the old
rule of the law that the husband is liable
for the torts of the wife committed during
coverture."
So strong a dissent on the part of
three members of the court, expressed,
it may at least be said, with rather more
legal precision than the opinion of the
court, is entitled to much consideration,
especially as it has on its side, as is believed, both the weight of authority and
reason.
It is safe to say that the general
tendency of the decisions upon married
women's acts has been to restrict the
operation of the acts rather than to extend them beyond the natural meaning
of the language employed. This is especially true of the decisions under the
New York and Pennsylvania acts, the
pioneers of all the statutes on the subject
of married women's property passed of
late years by so many of the states.
These acts are derogatory of the rules of
the common law, and for that reason are
to be strictly construed and not to be extended by implication beyond theirnatural import. This is in accordance with a
general rule for the construction of statutes applicable to all cases, for which we
need hardly cite authorities. Says KENT:
"It is not to be presumed that the legislature intended to make any innovation
upon the common lair further than the
caseabsolutely required:" 1Comm. 464,
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and in Dwarris on Stat. 185, it is said:
The law rather infers that the act did not
intend to make any alteration, other than
what is specified, and besides what has
been plainly pronounced; for if the Parliament had had that design, it is naturally said, they would have expresced
it. See also Mayo v. Wil1son, I N. II.
55 ; How v. Peckham, 6 How. P. It.
229; Van Horne v. Dorrance, 2 Dall.
316; Rice v. M. 6 N. W. R. R. Co., I
Blatch. 359; Talbot v. Simpson, Pet. C.
C. R. 188 ; Bear's Adm'r. v. Bear, 33
Pa. 527, where STRONG, J., says: "All
statutes changing the common law are not,
in connection with the married woman's
act of that state, to be extended by construction." So far as these statutes are
intended to remedy a mischief existqng
at common law, they have been liberally construed to effect that purpose ;
*but the mischief aimed at by these statutes is rather the hardship of subjecting
the wife's separate estate to the husband's debts and taking from the wife
the control and disposal of her own propery, than any supposed hardship in
imposing upon the husband a liability
for the torts of the wife committed during
coverture. In other words, the statutes had sought to remove the disabilities
of the wife and not to change the rights
or liabilities of the husband. The atility in question, arising most naturally
from.the relations that exigt between
husband and wife at common law, has
its foundation, not in the fact that the
husband becomes the possessor of his
wife's property as is suggested in the
principal case, but in the much more important principle of a unity of person
upon which, says Blackstone, depend
almost all their duties, rights and disabilities. To the same effect are all the
authorities. (See those cited below.)
It is equally well settled upon the authorities that the statutes have not had
the effect of destroying the unity of
person. See Diver v. Diver, 56 Pa. St.
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109, per STRONG, J., and other cases
below.
Whatever change in the marriage relation the future may bring forth, it
is practically impossible in the great
majority of cases, as society is now conrtituted, for the wife to acquire a separate
estate by her own exertions, even in
those states where the law secures to her
her own earnings. The division of labor
between the husband and wife that obtains at the present day, is such as to
make the husband by law the sole owner
of that which is in many, if not most
cases, really the product of the joint
labor of both husband and wife. To
take from the husband all liability for
the wife's torts committed during coverture, would be in most cases to give her
entire immunity from punishment in
such cases, and to leave any person who
may be injured by her torts practically
without redress.
In cases where the wife has a separate
estate, it would seem to be the best rule
.o hold them both liable to an action for
the wife's torts, with the proviso that, in
case of judgment, execution shall first
issue against the wife's estate ; this is
the rule in Pennsylvania and other states.
'Where both have property, that of the
wrongdoer should first bear the penalty
of the wrong, but in most cases there
will be no redress for the wife's wrong
except such as can be enforced against
the husband, the head of the family.
As was said above, married women's
acts being remedial of the common law,
will be so construed as to suppress the
mischief at which they were aimed, and
will not be extended further than is necessary to accomplish that result. In
Diver v. Diver, .supra, the court said:
"It need not be repeated that no greater
effect is to be given to the Act of 1848
than its spirit and language intend. It
is a remedial statute, and we construe it
so as to suppress the mischief against
which it was aimed, but not as altering

the common law any further than is
necessary to remove that mischief." In
Bear's Adrn'r v. Bear, 33 Pa. St. 527,
it was held that the mischief aimed at by
the legislature was the liability of the
wife's separate estate for her husband's
debts ; and the court said: IIHere "was
the mischief to be remedied, and the
statute is the remedy provided. We are
not at liberty, even if we have the disposition, to go beyond the spirit of the
enactment." And similar language was
used in Pcttit v. Fretz, 33 Pa. St. 118.
And the courts in that state have refused to construe the act as changing
the rule of common law, that under a
deed to a husband and wife the grantees
each become seised ofthe entirety, holding
per tout et non per myt: Diver v. Diver,
supra. And they have held that the
wife can convey her lands only by joining in a deed with her husband: Pettit
v. Fretz, 9 Casey 118 (on the ground that
since the statute a married woman does
not hold her property as afeme sole, but
as a married woman), and that the wife
cannot maintain an action of debt against
her husband by her next friend, on a
contract made during coverture: Bitter
v. Ritter, 31 Pa. SL 396.
The same tendency not to extend these
statutes by implication, may be observed
in the New York cases. In Perkins v.
Perkins,62 Barb. 531 (1872), which was
an action brought by a husband against
his wife for services performed for her,
there was a lengthy discussion of the proper method of construing these acts. The
language of the court is as follows:
"Except to the extent that the incapacity
of the wife to contract has been removed
by statute, the marriage relation in its oneness of unity remains as it was at common law. The new powers conferred by
these statutes were in derogation of common law and are to be strictly construed:
Graham v. Van W ck, 14 Barb. 531
**
* The husband has had no new
powers conferred upon him, nor has he
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been released from any duties and obligation imposed upon him. His condition
in this marriage relation is unchanged
so far as regards its unity. * * * The
recent statutes made in her behalf, -not
his, have to the extent expressed therein
enfranchised her as lo those rights, and
as to those only. * * They were passed
for her protection, not his. Shehas just
such power as the statute expressly confers on her, no more. Nor has he any
more. They have conferred none on him.
They have released nothing to him. * *
I feel bound to hold that the unity of
person created by the marriage contract,
has been no further severed than the
statutes, in express terms or by necessary
implication, have effected that purpose."
See also White v. Wager, 25 N. Y. 329.
In Cassin v. Delaaey, 38 N. Y. 178,
an action for malicious prosecution, decided in 1868, the court said, by lUNT,
C. J. : ",The authorities are clear that
when a tort or felony of any inferior
degree is committed by the wife in the
presence and by the direction of her hushand, she is not personally liable,"
which ruling will at least serve to show
that the courts have not departed materially from the old common-law rules in
that state.
In Tait v. Culbertson, 57 Barb. 9
(1869), which was an action for libel,
this subject was considered. The court
first stated the rule of common law as to
the husband's liability for his wife's
torts, and then said that the rule must be
considered as still in force in New York
unless it could be shown to have been
changed by statute, which, the court
held, there was not the least pretext for
assuming. They then show the changes
made in that state by statute, which
among other things allow a woman to
enjoy her property as if sole, to engage in
business on her own account, to charge
her separate estate on her contracts, and
tn sue alone for injuries committed
against her person or character; and

finally say, "It is sufficient to say that
there is no language of any statute general or special in its terms, from which
this change of the common-law rule can
be estahlished." In Braur v. Mullen,
47 N. Y. 577, while holding that under
the statutes of 1860 and 1862 the wife
may be sued in all matters having relation to her personal estate, the court
said, "The statute has not altered the
common-law liability of the husband for
the mere personal torts of his wife, though
as to torts committed in the management of her separate estate she is liable
the same as if she were unmarried."
oe v. Smith, 55 Barb. 417
And in
(1869), when the court held that under
the statute a married woman could be
sued alone for an injury done by er
P. J., dissenting on
cattle, BALCO,
the ground that the language of the
-statute was not strong enough to remove
the husband's liability for his wife's
torts, said, "The legislature must take
another step to relieve the husband from
liability for the torts of his wife, whether
she commit them with her own hands or
by allowing her cattle to trespass."
In Kowlng v. Mfanlyl, 57 Barb. 483
(1868), the plaintiff had deposited bonds
with the defendant subject to his written
order; the wife of the plaintiff forged an
order and obtained the bonds.' In action
for the value of the bonds it was held
that although the defendant was liable
for the value of the deposit, yet as the
plaintiff was responsible for his wife's
fraud to the defendant, he could not recover.
The court said in rendering their opinion: "This rule of the common law
is not changed or affected by the legislation in this state giving married women
the control of their property. While it
relieves them from many of the disabilities formerly resulting from the married
state, it does not discharge the husband
from the liabilities which that relation
imposed upon him for the torts of his
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wife." The reversal of this case on ap- may be sued as if sole for her torts compeal, 49 N. Y. .192 (1872), does not af- mitted without actual coercion, and that
fect it as an authority in point, for the she alone shall be liable to pay the
Court of Appeals held that the rule damages recovered in all such actions.
The case of M31cQueen v. Fulghaamn, 27
against circuity of actions did not apply to that case, because the defendants Texas 467, which was an action for
were liable to the plaintiff in an indivi- slander, is directly in point. In that
dual capacity, while his liability to them state the statutes provide that all prowas in the capacity of a husband for the perty of the wife owned before marriage
tort of his wife, which they held to be a or acquired during coverture by gift, devise or descent shall be her separate prodefeasible as well as a joint liability.
In Cominonwealth v. Wood, 97 Mass. perty subject to the husband's manage229 (1867), which, though not directly in ment during coverture. The language
point, may throw some light upon the of the court may be given at length :
subject, an indictment for keeping a bro"It is insisted however that the comthel, the wife of the defendant owned the mon-law doctrine upon this subject is
house, carried on the business and re- abrogated: in this state by our statutes
ceived all the profits, but the defendant regulating marital rights. With us the
lived with her and exercised various acts separate identity of the wife, with reof control and management ; he was held spect to her husband, is not merged in
to be responsible for her offence. In de- the husband. Her property is not vested
livering judgment the court said :-" It in him by marriage. But the commonis contended that the recent legislation law rule holding the husband responsible
of this Commonwealth has made married for the wife's torts does not rest enwomen so far independent of their hus- tirely upon the ground that he takes by
bands as to release the defendant from marriage all of her personal property,
responsibility for the conduct of his wife. and that she is presumed to have no sepIt is true that under our statutes arate estate. It rests perhaps mainly
* *
she may carry on a separate trade on upon the supposition that her nets are
her own account. But it has not been the result of the superior will and indecided how far this affects the husband's fluence of her husband. Owing to the
legal right to control her, nor is it ne- intimate relation between husband and
cessary to decide it in this case. These wife and to the nature of the control
provisions of the statute ielate to legiti- given him by law and social usage over
mate business. * * They do not take her conduct and actions, it would be
away the husband's power to regulate his difficult if not impossible for the courts
household so far as to prevent his wife to determine when she had acted at her
from committing this offence or relieve own instance, and when she was guided
him from responsibility if it is commit- by his dictation. While our statutes are
framed with the view of securing to the
ted."
The question has since been set at rest wife her separate property and of seduin that state by the Act of May 23d 1871, lously protecting her with reference to it
which provides that the- wife ihall sue against the recognised and controlling
and be sued in actions of tort in the influence of her husband over her consame manner as if sole, and that the duct, it would be a stretch of judicial auhusband shall not be liable to pay the thority to hold that the common-law re-.
judgment against her for damages. So sponsibility attaching to him for the acts
in Connecticut the Act of August Ist of his wife is by mere implication abol1872 has provided that a married woman ished."
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We have not been able to discover any
other cases in point. Those above cited
seem however to be enough to show that
the principal case is not in harmony with
the decisions in the other states. It is at
least exceedingly doubtful whether the
well recognised principles laid down for
the interpretation of statutes support the
decision, which the minority of the court
spoke of as a judicial repeal of the old
rule of thecommon law, and which seems
to be a clear encroachment upon the
rights of the legislature. A sounder
principle of decision was that adopted in
Ritter v. Bitter, 31 Pa. St. 396, where

the court deliver judgment in the following words : "We are asked to deduce
the legislative intention to confer a right
of action by the wife against her husband, from the provisions of our several
Acts of Assembly; but it is a sufficient
answer that no one of those acts expresses
that intention. If the legislature meant
that such action as this should be sustained, they had command of a very copious language in which to express their
will. They have not done it, and, until
they do, we will not infer it. When it
is done, the consequences must rest with
F. RAWLE.
those who did it."

United States District Court. Eastern Ditrict of Pennsyl-

vania. In Admiralty.
THE PENNSYLVANIA.
The rule of maritime law that a passenger who has no opportunity to leave a
vessel in distress, cannot render asalvage service, may admit ofa qualified exception
where he has promoted her safety by an extraordinary and peculiar service which
he was not compellable to render. But in admitting such an exception in favor
of a passenger, the greatest caution is necessary, and especially so where he is of
the nautical profession.
Where a passenger of the nautical profession who has rendered such service,
afterwards assumed and exercised illegitimate authority over the vessel, though the
circumstances were not such that he incurred an absolute forfeiture of the salvage
compensation, its amount was nevertheless materially reduced by reason of such
usurpation of authority.

Trots was a libel by Cornelius L. Brady against the steamer
Pennszlvania for salvage.
During her voyage the Pennsylvania encountered a severe
storm, during which at midnight she shipped a heavy sea that
carried away her forward hatches and the bridge on which were
the captain and first and second officers, all of whom were lost.
The libellant, a competent navigator, who was on board as a
passenger merely, assumed the command and retained it until the
arrival of the vessel in port. The other facts sufficiently appear
in the opinion.

C. M. Neal and Rufus E. Shapley, for libellant.
Morton P. Hlenry and Cuyler, for claimants.
VoL. XXII.-37

THE PENNSYLVANIA.
CADWALADER, D. J.-A vessel manned and otherwise fitted for
a voyage is often spoken of as having an organized representative
or artificial personality. A public armed vessel represents the
sovereignty of the nation to which she belongs. A merchant
vessel represents a little private community. It is a definite organized portion of the social system of her nation. Judges, on
both sides of the Atlantic, have assimilated such a vessel, when on
the high sea, to a floating portion of this nation's territory, of
which, though temporarily detached, it continues to be a part.
Her internal relations are determined by its laws, and her external
relations by the laws of the sea, 'which constitute a part of the
system of universal jurisprudence. Under certain qualifications,
her exterritoriality is through international comity, recognised,
even when she is in foreign territory.
These observations, in part, explain the remark of Alontesquieu,
that mariners are citizens or inhabitants of the vessel. They cannot rightfully leave her, unless their association with her is legally
at an end, through the conventional termination of their voyage,
or otherwise. Till then they can be compulsorily detained in her.
The relation of a passenger to a vessel is different. If a sailor
has been rightly described as an inhabitant of the vessel, and as
in subjection to her government, a passenger may be compared to
a mere sojourner in her who is only in temporary'subjection. A
passenger, while on board, may, indeed, be considered as one of
her company, but not in the same light as one of her crew. The
passenger may leave her at his pleasure, if an opportunity occurs
before the end of this conventional passage; and may do so even
in time of danger, however great.
For this reason, if the vessel is in distress, and a passenger who
has an opportunity of leaving her chooses to remain on board, he
may stand afterwards, upon a question of salvage service, nearly
or quite in the same relation as if he were not associated with her
at all. He may therefore entitle himself to compensafion of the
nature of salvage by rendering even service of ordinary bodily
labor, as in pumping or otherwise. 'But where he has had no such
opportunity of dissociating himself from the vessel, he is, in time
of danger, compellable to render, to the utmost of.his ability, like
service with any other person of her company; and, as to such
service, cannot have any claim of salvage.
It by no means follows that a passenger peculiarly capable of
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rendering extraordinary service, far beyond that of one of a good
crew, is, in all cases whatever, compellable to render it, or that,
if lie does render it with useful effects, lie cannot, in any
casc, become entitled to compensation of the nature of salvage.
We may suppose the case of a ship, or her cargo, partially on fire,
the ship having on board a passenger who is a chemist, with a sort
(if travelling laboratory. Ile may have, in this laboratory, the probable means of checking the fire, but perhaps not without some
risk, to himself and others, of increasing the danger. If, by professional skill and judgment, under the authority of the navigator
of the vessel, the chemist makes the experiment, and there is a
successful result, is he to receive no compensation ? If he should
be compensated, is not the compensation for a service of the nature
of salvage ?
The decision in the case of the steamer Great Eastern answers
the question. When that vessel was three hundred miles from"
land her paddle-wheels were disabled, so that she could be moved
by the screw alone. While she w's in this condition, the rudder
shaft was broken. and was disconnected from the steering gear, so
that she became quite unmanageable. Her officers in vain endeavored to substitute and secure some appliance by which to work
the shaft. A passenger, who was a,mechanician, then devised,
and, with the consent of the master and the assistance of the crew,
executed a plan for the purpose, which was successful. This was
done by a skilful use and adaptation of fixtuies, tackle and apparel
of the vessel herself. For the service $15,000 was decreed to the
passenger as salvage: 11 Law Times, N. S. 516. The reason
of the decision was that this highly beneficial service had been
peculiar and extraordinary, and such as he was not compellable to
perform. This decision is, I think, right in principle. But it establishes what must be considered as an -exception from a rule.
The rule is that a passenger cannot be a salvor. The exception,
lest it should engender litigation, and promote insubordination,
must not be admitted without the greatest caution. Especially
must such caution be observed where the passenger is of the nautical profession.
In the presefit case, a large steamer, worth perhaps half a million of dollars, with passengers and a cargo, having four officers,
besides the master, encountered, in mid-ocean, a tempest of great
violence. During the storm, when changing watches at midnight,
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she shipped a heavy sea which stove in the forward hatches, and
swept away the house forward, carrying overboard the master and
first and second officers, with two of the crew.
So long as any officer of a vessel is on board, and not disabled,
there can be no suspension of the executive authority of her internal government. Therefore, at this crisis, the command legally
devolved at once upon the third officer. He, however, did not
assume it, but was for some time fully and usefully engaged in securing the forward hatches, or in superintending the securing of
them. The fourth officer had been previously disabled, and was not
on duty. The wheel was fully and properly manned, but this was at
no time otherwise. But there was no officer of the deck surviving,
and there was urgent necessity for such an officer to give directions
to the men at the wheel. It was a crisis of great peril. There
was, at all events, great seeming danger; and it would now be
mere idling to inquire speculatively how far actual danger may
really have existed. The after-born supposed wisdom from such
a retrospect might be arrogant folly. There certainly was also
great alarm, with ample supposed cause; and a general panic, if
not prevented, might have soon ensued; and this might, in its
consequences, have been dangerous, if not disastrous.
At this crisis the libellant intervened meritoriously. He was
on board simply as a passenger, who, as such, had paid his fare.
He was a competent professional master navigator, with former
experience in the command of sailing-vessels and of steamers. He
went to the wheel-house and promptly assumed command or direction therej doing whatever was necessary and proper for the exigency. He thus averted, until the termination of the storm,
whatever danger may have been caused by the unfortunate loss of
the master.
I think that this was a salvage service. The difficulties in the
way of so deciding are great. But those in opposition to such a
contrary decision would be greater. It is true that when the third
officer succeeded of right to the command of the vessel, he might
have ordered the libellant to take the watch during the emergency.
The libellant would certainly have been compellable to go to the
wheel-house. If he had been directed, when there, to act as officer
of the deck, it would, I think, have been his duty to obey, and to
execute his office to the best of his ability. Had he done so,
under such orders, I do not, as at present advised, think that it
would have been a salvage service. But without orders, lie was
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not compellable to decide who should have the watch, or to take
upon himself the direction, with its cares and responsibilities.
At the crisis of danger there was no means of organizing the
internal government of the vessel, unless through immediate energetic action of the third officer. That officer did not thus act.
The libellant was, therefore, justifiable, under the law of maritime
necessity, in acting upon his own responsibility, as officer of the
deck. There was, at this time, therefore, no usurpation of unlawful authority by him. This being so, his conduct thus far was
meritorious and highly beneficial; and the service was, under the
circumstances, extraordinary. It was a peculiar service for one
who was not of the crew to take the command of the watch without
being assigned to'it.
On the next morning, the storm having ceased or abated, and
no special danger continuing to exist, the chief engineer and purser, and some others on board, without consulting the third officer4
whose authority alone they should have recognised, wrongfully assumed upon themselves to offer the command of the vessel to the
libellant, and urgently invited him to assume it as master. He
very improperly did so. Ile did not consult the third officer, but
nominated him as first officer. It is contended that the third officer acquiesced in what would thus otherwise have been usurpation.
An English judge has recently said that quiescence is not acquiescence. Mere enforced submission certainly is not. The third
officer here submitted, but did not acquiesce..
The libellant continued to act in this usurped relation of master
of the vessel for several days, until she reached the port of destination.
On her arrival, the owners, who are here defendants, gave thanks,;
in writing, to the libellant, as for extraordinary services, and offered
him what would have been a liberal gratuity for meritorious
conduct if he had been an officer of the vessel. But the amount
offered was greatly below the least possible estimate of compensation for a salvage service.
Ile now alleges that he became of right master of the vessel, and
thus rendered a continuing salvage service. This unfounded pretension is, of course, rejected.
The question then arises, whether through his usurpation of the
command of the vessel after the storm, lie has incurred a forfeiture
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of the salvage compensation to which he was otherwise entitled for
his prior service.
I do not think that, under the peculiar circumstances of the
case, an absolute forfeiture of the whole amount was incurred retroactively by his assumption and exercise of the illegitimate au-thority. But the effect of this usurpation must necessarily be to
reduce very materially the amount which would otherwise be
awardable to him.
What the reduced amount ought to be is not easily determinaable. I have hesitated between three thousand and four thousand
dollars, and have determined on the greater sum partly because I
think that the defendants' letter of thanks almost invited the litigation which has followed, and though not so intended, must have
induced a high estimate by the libellant of the value of the service.
Costs are adjudged to the libellant; but under the head of depositions, taxable costs will not be allowed to an amount exceeding
two hundred dollars. The testimony is of great bulk, but of no
proportionate weight; and its excess in bulk ought not to be allowed to swell the costs.
Decree for libellant for four thousand dollars, provided that,
under the head of depositions, costs exceeding two hundred dollars
will not be taxed or allowed.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
PITTSBURGH & CONNELLSVILLVE RAILROAD CO. v. ANDREWS.
It is such negligence for a passenger in a railroad car to allow his arm to project
out of the window, that if it is injured by coming in contact with any external
object he cannot recover, notwithstanding the injury may have been partly caused
by the negligence of the company in permitting an obstacle to be too near the
track.
Where a witness is asked on cross-examination if he had a certain conversation
with a person named and denies it, the deposition of the person with whom the alleged conversation took place is admissible to impeach the witness, notwithstanding it was taken under a commission at the execution of which the witness sought
to be impeached was not examined.

THIS was an action brought by the appellee to recover damages
for injuries received while being carried as a passenger over the
appellant's railroad on the 18th of July 1872. He purchased
a ticket from McKeesport to Cumberland, and when injured was
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sitting in the tecond car from the engine.
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The train left Connells-

ville between ten and eleven o'clock at night, and when about half
a mile from that station, while going at less than half speed, struck
a freight-car which was left standing on a siding, in a position so
near to the-switth as not to permit the passage of the train without striking it. The locomotive struck the end of the freight-car,
knocked it aside, and the train passed without any other collision,
except a slight scratch to the sleeping-car, which was about nine
inches wider than the others. No one was hurt except the plaintiff, whose right arm was broken in several places and permanently
injured. The car in which he was riding did not come in contact
with the freight-car,, and it was admitted his arm at the time
was out of the window. He was a man of mature years, and he
would have received no injury if his arm had not been in this position. As to how it came to be thus protruded, the testimony was
conflicting. The plaintiff testified that he was sitting with his elbov
inside of the car on the window-sill, and the jar pitched him forward, and in attempting to catch.himself his arm went out of the
window, and was caught betweerk the two cars; that the window
was up when he entered the car; that he did not lie with elbow
out of the window or lay his head on his arm; was not asleep at
the time, and did not recollect that the conductor came to him
when taking up tickets, and cautioned him it was dangerous to lie
in that manner, or pulled him out of the window. On the other
hand, the testimony of the conductor and of a fellow-passenger in
the same car was to the effect that a few minutes before the accident, when the conductor came through the car taking up tickets,
the plaintiff was lying in his seat with his arm out of the window,
and his head resting on his arm, that the conductor took hold of
him, shook him and pulled him out of the window, and told him to
take his head in or he would get it knocked off; that his elbow
must from his position at the time of the accident have extended
out over the window-sill, and the jar was so slight that it could riot
have thrown his arm out of the window.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.-The appellant insists the jury should have been instructed that if they found the accident occurred as stated by the
witnesses for the defence, then there was such want of ordinary
care and prudence on the part of the plaintiff, directly contributing
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to the injury, as to prevent a recovery, notwithstanding the negligence of the defendant, and several prayers were presented to
that effect, which were refused. Whether such an instruction
ought to have been given, is the main question in the case.
The general rule is that negligence is a question for the jury to
decide upon all the facts and circumstances of each case, but while
this is the general rule, cases may and sometimes do occur where
the court is required to declare some plain act of carelessness on
the plaintiff's part to be in law such contributing negligence as will
prevent a recovery, or on the other band, where there is no proof
of negligence on the part of the defendant, or where such proof is
so slight and inconclusive in its nature, as to demand from the
court an instruction, as to its legal insufficiency to prove negligence
in order to prevent the jury from indulging in wild speculation or
irrational conjecture: Shipley's Case, 31 Md. 270. The power of
the court thus to interpose-has been uniformly asserted by the Appellate Court of this state as well as by the courts of England
and of our sister states, though instances calling for its exertion
are comparatively rare. We have sustained its exercise in the two
recent cases of The Baltimore City Passenger Railway Co. v.
Wilkinson, 30 Md. 224, and Lewis v. The Baltimore . Ohio
Railroad Co., decided at our last term, ante, p. 284.
Among the numerous accidents that have occurred on railways
there have been many cases identical or nearly so with the present,
and the very question it is our duty now to determine has arisen,
and been decided by the courts of last resort in other states. The
first is that of the New Jersey Railroad Co. v. Kennard,9 Harris
203, decided in 1853. In that case C. J. GIBSoN, at nisiprius,in
his charge to the jury, said, "A carrier of either goods or passengers is bound to provide a carriage or vehicle perfect in all its parts,
in default of which he becomes responsible for any loss or injury
that may be suffered, provided it happen without negligence or
misconduct on the part of the party injured. A carrier of passengers is bound to omit no precaution that may conduce to their
safety. He is bound to guard beforehand against every apparent
danger that may beset them. The danger incident to travelling in
railway cars are few in comparison with those incident to other
modes of travel: but among the most prominent of them is risk of
injury to limbs stuck out of the windows where the cars are not so
constructed as to prevent it. Any one who has travelled by rail-
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way must have observed that even the most careful passengers forget the risk, and unconsciously suffer their elbows to slip out beyo,,d the window-sill. What can the carrier do to prevent this?
No more is required than a few metallic rods set in the window
perpendicularly at" horizontally, or a netting of wirework, or even
wooden slats. None of these would materially impede the circulation of air or abridge the comfort of the passengers, ihile it
would make-their safety sure. A car without any of these' appli"ances is, to coin a phrase, not roadworthy, and a carrier is responsible for any loss that may happen from that cause alone. It is a
notorious custom in railway cars, and it is proved to be so by the
evidence in the cause, for passengers next to the windows to rest
their elbows on the sills of them, and carriers are bound to take
notice of the customs and habitudes of railway passengers, and to
provide for them. If a passenger therefore sits and rides in a car
as others generally do, and receives injury from an imperfect con-,
struction of it, the carrier is liable for it."
lIe then told the jury lie would leave it for them to say whither
the resting of his arm on the window-sill with his elbow outside
of it was contributing negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
That charge was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a short per
c'riam opinion, with the reservation that the language of the
learned judge seems to be too broad as a general principle, where
he says that no car is good if the windows are not so constructed
as to prevent passengers from putting their limbs through them;
but in its application to a road which in some places is so narrow
as to endanger projecting limbs, as here, the instruction is proper.
In Holbrook v. The Utica & Schenectady Railroad Co., 12 New
York 236, decided in 1855, the judge at the trial was requested
by the defendant's counsel to charge the jury as matter of law,
that if they found that the plaintiff's arm or elbow was outside of
the window of t-he car when the injury was received it was an act
of negligence, and she could not recover, but he refused to charge
on that subject further than he had already done. In the Court
of Appeals the. opinion was delivered by RUGGLES, J., who, on that
question, says : "In this refusal to charge as requested, I was at
first inclined to think there was error, but my brethren are unanimously of opinion that the judge had already charged the jury
substantiallyin conformity with the request, and that he was right
therefore in declining to repeat what he had before stated. I yield
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to their judgment and concur in affirming the judgment." From
this it is clear the court was unanimous in opinion that the law of
the requested charge was correct.
Next in order of time is the case of Todd v. Old Colony & Pall
River .RailroadCo., 3 Allen 18, decided in 1861, in which the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts reversed an instruction which
left the question of negligence to the jury, and say: "If the plaintiff was riding in the car with his elbow or arm projecting out of
the window, by reason of which he sustained an injury, he was
guilty of a want of due care which would prevent him from maintaining his action. Looking at the mode in which railroads are
constructed, with posts and barriers which are placed very near
to the track on which the cars are to pass, the rapid rate at which
trains move, the manner in which cars are made with seats to accommodate passengers so as to avoid any exposure of the body or
limbs to outward objects in passing, we can see no ground on which
it can be contended that a person travelling on a.railroad is exercising reasonable care in placing his arm in such a position that it
protrudes from a window, and may come in contact with external
obstructions; certainly if it is a want of due care to attempt to
leave a car when the train is in motion, although going at a slow
rate of speed, as has been heretofore determined by this court, it
is no less a want of proper care to ride in a car with an arm or
leg exposed to collision against passing trains, or the necessary
structures on the side of the track. Nor was it the province of
the jury to determine as a matter of fact whether the plaintiff
used due and reasonable care, if it was proved that his arm or a
portion of it was outside of the window at the time of the accident. If there was no dispute or controversy about this fact, and
the position of his arm was the cause of or contributed to the accident, the plaintiff failed to prove an essential element to the
maintenance of his action. In such-a state of the evkdence it was
the duty of the court to decide on its legal effect, and to say to
the jury, the plaintiff had failed to make out his ease." Wheih
the same case again came before the court in 7 Allen 207, the
former decision was reaffirmed, and most emphatically as to the
power and duty of the court in such cases to pronounce upon the
legal effect of admitted facts.
Next is the case of*The Pittsburgh P Uonnelhsville Railroad Co.
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r. M.Curg, 7 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 277, decided in 1867. The
phlintiff ill that case suffered his elbow to project from the window,
and it was broken by coming in contact with a car standing on a
switch. At th'e trial the judge, following the ruling in Kennard's
Ca8e, instructed .the jury that a passenger on a railway-car-who
has unconsciously suffered his elbow to slip out beyond the windowsill is not necessarily guilty of negligence, and submitted it to
them as a question of fact whether under all the circumstances of
the case, the plaintiff in permitting his arm or elbow so to project
was or was not guilty of negligence. This ruling being assigned
for error, the Supreme Court carefully considered the question.
Their opinion was delivered by C. J. TiiomPSON, who says, "We
must regard the remark, ' unconsciously suffered his elbow -to slip
beyond the window-sill,' to mean inattentively. In that sense it
was negligently suffered to slip. Of course this was negligence
in 8e, unless he was under no obligation to take care of himsel4
But no case asserts that, and every case the contrary. Out of the
omission to do so springs the doctrine of contributory negligence,
which defeats a plaintiff, and which is so firmly established as a
principle of law, that nobody dreams of doubting it. We have
then the case broadly, I think, that negligence is not to be inferred,
when injury accrues from an exposure of an elbow, or an arm, out
of a car-window, if it be not wilfully done. This cannot be maintained on any reasonable principle, we think. When a passenger
on a railroad purchases his ticket, it entitles him to a seat in the
cars. In the seat no part of his body is exposed to obstacles outside of the car. Ie is secure there ordinarily, from any contact
with them. Where he is thus provided with a seat, safe and secure
in the absence of accident to the train, and the carrier has a safe and
convenient car, well conducted, and skilfully managed, his duty is
performed towards the passenger. The duty of the latter on
entering, arises namely, that-he will conform to all the reasonable
rules and regulations of the company, for occupying, using and
leaving the cars, and after doing so, if injury befall him by the
negligence of the carriers, they must answer ; if he do not so conform, but is guilty of negligence therein, and is injured, although
there may be negligence on the part of the carriers, he cannot
recover." Reference is then made to several authorities in support of this position, and among others to Penna. Railroad Co.
v. Zebe &5Wife, 9 Casey 318, where it was held the company's
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liability could not be fixed for any injury consequent on a choice of
the passenger, in disregard of the provisions made by it for his
safety; that it was error to submit the question of the right of
the parties to leave the cars at either side to the jury, in the
absence of proof of justifying necessity for so doing ; that it was
not negligence on the part of the company that they did not by
force of barriers prevent the parties from leaving at the wrong
side ; that people are not to be treated as cattle; they are presumed to act reasonably in all given contingencies, and the company had no reason to expect anything else in that case. The
opinion then proceeds: "A passenger on entering a railroad-car is
to be presumed to know the use of a seat, and the use of a window;
that the former is to sit in, and the latter is to admit light and
air. Each has its separate use. The seat he may occupy in any
way most comfortable to himself. The window he has a right to
enjoy, but.not to occupy. Its use is for the benefit of all, not for
the comfort alone of him, who has by accident got nearest it. If
therefore he sit with his elbow in it, he does so without authority,
and if he allow it to protrude out, and is injured, is this due care
on his part? He was not put there by the carrier, nor invited to
go there, nor misled in regard to the fact, that it is not a part of
his seat, nor that its purposes were not exclusively to admit light
and air for the benefit of all. His position is therefore without
authority. His negligence consists in putting his limbs where
they ought not to be, and liable to be broken, without his ability
to know whether there is danger or not approaching. In a case,
therefore, where the injury stands confessed, or is proved to have
resulted from the position voluntarily or thoughtlessly taken in a
window, by contact with outside obstacles or forces, it cannot be
otherwise characterized than as negligence, and so to be pronounced
by the court," and further : "In the absence of some justifying necessity or incapacity to take care of himself on the part of the passenger, no one can doubt, I think, from the reason of the thing, in
view of the nature of the vehicle used, being a railroad car, that to
extend an arm or a hand beyond the window-sill is dangerous, and
is recklessness or negligence. Whenever the facts present such a
case singly, and without any controlling or justifying necessity,
we think the court ought to declare the act negligence; and as
there was nothing like this shown in the case before us, we think
the court ought not to have affirmed the plaintiff's point. Uncon-
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sciously exposing himself did not help the plaintiff's case, as it
was not shown that his unconsciousness was not the result of the
want of prudent attention to his situation on the part of the plaintiff. It would be a novel answer to the allegation of negligence,
to allege that th6 plaintiff had slept in the position be was in when
hurt, and that would be a condition of unconsciousness. Sleeping
when due care would require one to be awake, or in dangerous
circumstances, is negligence, and no answer to the company can
be given to such act. Of course these views are predicated of a
case in which there are no facts to qualify or justify the act. It
is possible that a state of facts might be found to show an exception to the rule, and where that occurs the rule ceases. But none
such appear as this case is presented." The court then proceed to
examine Kennard's Case, and deliberately overrule it, as well as
the charge of C. J. GIBSON therein; and great as is our respect
and admiration for the learning and ability of that distinguished
jurist, we yet think, the weight of reason and authority is with
the decision which has overruled his judgment on this question.
The plain doctrine of McClurg's Cae, is that if a sane person
of mature years, while a passenger in a railroad car, without any
controlling or justifying necessity or cause for so doing, voluntarily
or inattentively protrudes his elbow or arm from the window and
it is injured by coming in contact with any external obstacle or
force, it is such a clear act of contributory neg'.igence on his part
as will prevent a recovery, and that it is the duty of the court so
to instruct the jury, as matter of law, notwithstanding the negligence of the company in permitting the obstacle to be placed too
near the track of the passing train.
About the same time the Supreme Court of Indiana decided
precisely in the same way, in a case involving the same question:
Indianapolis C&incinnati RailroadCo.v. Rutherford, 7 Am. Law
Reg. N. S.476, and following these is a decision to the same
effect by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky: Louisville ,f Nashville Railroad Co. v. Siiccvgs, 5 Bush 1. These decisions are
approved by Judge REDFIELD in his note to McClurg's Case, in 2
American Railway Cases 552, where be says, "we can entertain
no possible question that these later cases are entirely sound, and
that Kennard's Case was decided upon mistaken grounds," and
adds, "the rule is without exception in all the well considered
cases, that the plaintiff cannot recover for any damage he may
.
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sustain where his own want of ordinary care contributed directly
towards it, however great or extreme may have been the negligence
on the part of the defendant."
Opposed to these authorities, there are besides Kennard's Case,
the two cases of Spencer v. Milwaukee & Prairiedt Chien Railroad Co., 17 Wisconsin 487, and Chicago & Alton Railroad Co.
v. Pondrom, 51 Illinois 333. The former is directly in point, and
presents the opposing views very forcibly. In the latter the decision, as we understand it, was 'actually rested upon a principle of
law established in that siate, that where there has been contributing
negligence, the negligence of both parties must be compared, and
if the plaintiff is guilty of negligence which is slight as compared
with that of the defendant, he may recover. Such a principle has
never been sanctioned in this state, but the exact contrary is the
*settled rule here (Geis's Case, 41 Md. 866), and the Illinois .court
admits the doctrine is not supported by the weight of authority else-where. They refer however to Kennard's Case, and to f1cClurg's
Case, and think the former the better considered of the two, based
C
on sounder reasons, more.in harmony with the analogies of the
law, and entitled to more weight. With great respect for the
judgmients of that learned tribunal, we entertain, and have expressed, a different opinion; we think the latter is better reasoned,
as well as supported by the decided preponderance of authority,
and have no hesitation in accepting it, with the other cases to the
same effect, as containing a correct exposition of the law on .this
subject.
In our review and citations from the decisions upon this question
(which have been more extended than usual, or perhaps than is
necessary), we have noticed those only which are exactly or nearly
identical with the case before us, and have refrained from making
any reference to a large number of others, both in this country
and in England, where in similar and analogous cases, the courts
have interposed, and either withdrawn them frotu the jury, or
given to the jury imperative construction as to the legal effect of
facts admitted, or to be found by them.
It follows there was error in the refusal to grant several of the
defendant's prayers, and especially the third, seventh and eighth,
as well as in the first instruction given by the court or. its own
motion. Upon the assumption the jury would find the facts therei'.
hypothetically stated, these prayers of the defendant, though appa-
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rently more numerous than the exigencies of the case required,
embody each a correct legal proposition. It must be observed
however that while it is admitted the plaintiff's arm was out of the
window at the time of the accident, there is a conflict of testimony,
as to how it camoe to be thus exposed, whether as stated by the
plaintiff, or by the witnesses for the defence. This question of
f'aut it is the undoubted province of the jury to determine, and
upon the weight of evidence in this respect, it is not our 'province
to express any opinion. Thejury therefore having the unquestioned
right to give credit to the testimony of the plaintiff, and reject that
for the defence, there was no error in rejecting the defendant's first
and second prayers. The ninth and tenth prayers need not be
critically examined. If they were intended to assert the same
proposition contained in the third, seventh and eighth, they were
who.jly unnecessary; and if their purpose was to announce any
legal proposition different from that which we have in this opini6n
declared, and adopted, then there was no error in rejecting them.
We find no error in the rejection of the eleventh prayer. All the
law to which the company was entitled upon the theory of the
case which this prayer contemplates, is contained in their sixth
prayer, which was granted. Their fourth and fifth prayers proceed
upon the assumption the jury were to determine the question of
contributory negligence, and in that view of the case, the same law
was embodied in the first instruction of the court. It does not
follow there was error in the rejection of these prayers, because
we have said there was error in this instruction, inasmuch as both
assumed the same theory of the case. Upon that theory the
court's instruction gave the company the benefit of the same law
sought by these prayers. No objection was made in argument to
the court's second instruction, on the question of damages, and we
do not understand the exception as extending to this ruling. But
if it does, there is no error in it. The measure of damages is
therein correctly defined according to numerous decisions of this
court on that subject.
The plaintiff's first prayer states the law as announced in Stokes
v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181, Stockton v. Preyl, 4 Gill 406, and
l1orthington's Case, 21 Md. 275, about which there can in this
state at least be no doubt, viz. : that the occurrence of an accident
and injury to a passenger is priindfacie evidence of negligence
in the carrier, and throws upon him the onus of rebutting the pre-
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sumption by proving there was no negligence on his part. But
in those cases there was no proof, and no question of contributory
negligence in the plaintiff. The courts in those cases were not
dealing with a case like this, in which the right of the recovery is
affected by, and dependent upon, the presence or absence of such
negligence. In this case it was error to instruct the jury that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon proof of the injury, unless the
company showed such injury did not result from their negligence,
without noticing or instructing them as to the effect of contributory
negligence on his part. No doubt the court intended the last
clause of its first instruction as a modification of this prayer, but
as the two stand, and upon the assumption there was no error in
that given by the court, there seems to be a plain inconsistency
between them well calculated to confuse and mislead the jury.
The only remaining question in the case, is that presented by
the first exception. The plaintiff when under cross-examination
as a witness, was asked " did you or not, on the morning after
the accident, have a conversation with David Welsh in front of
the Yough House, in which you said, you must have been lying
with your aria out of the window, and something struck it, and
that was all you knew ?" to which witness replied, " he did not
know Welsh, and had no such conversation." He was then asked
"if he had on the morning after the accident in Connellsville any
conversation with any one, in which he said that he must have
been lying with his arm out of the window, and something struck
it, and that was all he knew?" to which he replied "he had no
such conversation with any one." The defendant then, for the
purpose of impeaching the plaintiff as a witness, offered a part of
the testimony of Welsh, which had been taken and returned under
a foreign commission, in which he says in answer to an interrogatory whether he had any conversation with the plaintiff about his
injury, and if so, state what that conversation was ? "I had a
conversation with the plaintiff about his injury; he was brought
to my house, and I asked him how he got his arm hurt; he said he
must have been lying with his arm out of the window, and something struck it, and that was all he knew, until he came to himself." Objection was made to the offer of this testimony for the
purpose of impeaching the plaintiff as a witness, which the court
sustained, but admitted the testimony as a declaration of the plain-
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tiff as to the manner in which the injury occurred. To this ruling
the defendant excepted.
A majority of the court are of the opinion, there was a sufficient
foundation laid for the introauction of impeaching testimony,
and that the defendant had the right to use testimony of Welsh
for that purpose, notwithstanding it was taken under a commission
at the execution of which the witness sought to be impeached was
not examined.
Judgment reversed, and new trial awarded.

Supreme Court of Ohio.
JOHN SWASEY

ET AL. V.

M. T. ANTRAM

ET AL.

Where one of the defendants, in an action on a joint contract, (lies before judg;
ment, and the judgment is taken against all the defendants, without any suggestion of his death, or making his representatives parties, such judgment is not void,
but merely voidable, and is a determination of the action, within the meaning of
sections 218 and 219 of the code, authorizing an action by the plaintiff in attachment against the garnishee.
A married woman has not capacity to enter into a general mercantile partnership not connecte" with or relating to her separate property, and where she assumes to do so with the consent of her husband, and is by him assisted in managing-and carrying on the business, the husband, and not the wife, is to bo regarded in law as the partner.
A feme cov'ert having obtained a "permit" to trade within the lines of the
army, with the knowledgo and consent of her husband entered into a partnership
with other persons, for the purpose of buying and selling goods and merchandise*
under said "permit," and herself, with the assistance of her husband, managed
and conducted the business. The firm was subsequently dissolved, and its property transferred by the other partners to her, she agreeing to pay all the partnership debts. She then sold the property to S., who had notice of all the facts, and
who in like manner agreed to pay the partnership debts. This was all done
with the knowledge and concurrence of the husband, who joined her in executing
the bill of sale to S. In an actibn by a creditor of the firm against the lusband
and the other members of the firm, not including the wife: Held, that the goods
in the hands of S., or the price agreed by him to be paid therefor, and not yet
paid, are liable to attachment in the action.

ERROR to the Superior Court of Cincinnati.
Antram & Co. brought an action against Iazard L. Baldwin
and three other named persons, to recover the price of goods alleged to have been sold by Antram & Co. to the defendants, while
the latter were doing business as partners under the name of M. J.
Baldwin & Co. The suit was commenced by a writ of attachment,
VOL. XXIL.-38
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and no personal service was made on the defendants. Process of
garnishment was served upon Swasey & Co. charging that they
had property of the defendants in their hands, or were indebted
to them, and Swasey & Co. answered, denying all indebtedness and
liability. Antram & Co. took judgment by default against the
defendants in attachment. At the date of this judgment, Hazard
L. Baldwin, one of the defendants, was dead, having died after
the commencement of the suit; but the plaintiffs being ignorant
of the fact, no suggestion of his death was made, nor were his legal
representatives made parties. After obtaining their judgment,
M. T. Antram & Co., being dissatisfied with the answer of Swasey
& Co., brought an action against them (under the 218th section
of the Code, S. & 0. 1009), charging that they had property in their
hands, or were indebted to an amount exceeding the sum so
recovered. The cause was submitted to the court upon the
pleadings and an agreed statement, which embody substantially
the following facts:In 1864, Mary J. Baldwin, the wife of said Hazard L. Baldwin, with the assent of her husband, procured a" permit" to trade
within the lines of the Federal army, and for that purpose, with
lile consent, entered into a partnership with the said three other
persons so sued as co-defendants with her husband in the attachment suit. The business consisted in buying and selling goods,
and was managed principally by her, assisted by her husband.
The business was commenced without capital, the goods being purchased on credit, and the claim of M. T. Antram & Co. was a debt
due for goods sold to the firm.
In May 1865, the firm of M. J. Baldwin & Co. was dissolved,
and its property and effects sold by the other partners to Mrs.
Baldwin, she agreeing to pay all the partnership debts. This was
done with the consent of her husband; and with like consent, in
June 1865, the entire property and effects were sold by her to
Swasey & Co., the husband, as well as the wife, signing the bill of
sale. Although this bill of sale purports to be an absolute transfer and conveyance, it was in fact intended as a mortgage, to secure
a debt due to Swasey & Co. Swasey & Co., however, took the
property upon the same terms as did Mrs. Baldwin-that is, they
were to pay all the partnership debts, including the debt due to
Antram & Co. The property was amply sufficient to pay all the
debts. It was not actually delivered to Swasey & Co., at the time
of the sale, but was subsequently managed, and sold from time to

SWASEY v. ANTRAM.

time, by Mrs. Baldwin, as agent for Swasey & Co., and the proceeds paid over to them as they came to hand, her husband assisting her in managing the business.
After service of the process of garnishment upon Swasey & Co.,
the principal part of the debt due to them having been thus paid
from the proceeds of the property, the remainder of the property
and effects was reconveyed by them to Mrs. Baldwin.
On these facts, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs.
G. D. Coffin, T. a. Mitchell and W.
tiffs in error.

. Ram8ey, for plain-

Stanley lIathews and J. P. Baldwin, for defendants in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WELCI, J.-We are unanimous in the opinion that thisjudgmentk
should be affirmed, although we differ somewhat as to the ground
on which the affirmance ought to be placed.
A majority of the court are of opinion that the husband, Hazard
L. Baldwin, and not his wife, under the circumstances, became and
was a member of the firm of M. J. Baldwin & Co., at least so far
as to make him liable for its debts; that the sale of the partnership
effects by the firm, nominally to the wife, was in law a sale to the
husband; that the sale to Swasey & Co., nominally by the wife
and husband, was in law and in fact a sale by the husband; that
Swasey & Co., by their agreement to pay the debts of the firm of
MT. J. Baldwin & Co., became liable and indebted to Hazard L.
Baldwin, one of the defendants in attachment, and therefore liable
to the process of garnishment.
This property was in no proper sense the separate estate of the
wife, nor was it purchased with her separate property. It does
not fall within any of the denominations of property declared by
the Act of 1861 (S. & S. 389) to be the separate property of tile
wife. The "permit" under which the business was carried on was
not property, in the statutory sense. Besides, she had no capacity
to enter into such a contract of partnership, to bind herself to pay
for the goods purchased by the firm, or to pay the price stipulated
for the goods sold by the firm to her. Her acts in all these matters, being done with the knowledge and concurrence of her husband, must be held in law to be his acts, so far at least as regards
his rights and liabilities as between himself and third persons.
The promise of Swasey & Co. to pay the debts of the firm was, in
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law and under the circumstances, a promise made to the husband,
and enforceable by him, if not also by his copartners and codefendants in the action.
But suppose the law were otherwise, and that by her purchase
of the goods from her partners, she, andinot her husband, became
vested with the absolute ownership of the property. I am inclined
to hold, as the court below seems to have held, that in that case
her p-romise to pay the debt of the firm, being the promise of a
feme covert, and therefore a mere nullity, she held the property in
the character of trustee or agent, and subject to the fulfilment of
her promise; and if so, Swasey & Co., taking the goods of her
with knowledge of these facts, and upon a similar promise, held
them subject to the same equity or right of reclamation in favor
of the other partners of the firm. If we call this a "trust," it
would not be a trust in favor of the creditors of M. J. Baldwin &
Co., as counsel seem to suppose in their argument, but a trust in
favor of M. J, Baldwin & Co., or the retiring members of the firm.
A majority of the members of the court, however, disincline to
put the decision of the case upon this ground, and hold, as I have
indicated, that the husband, and not the wife, is to be regarded as
the real party in these transactions, and the wife as acting in the
capacity of his agent.
But it is objected that the judgment in the attachment case was
not final, and that, therefore, the suit was not" determined," within the meaning of section 219 of the Code. (S. & C. 1009.) The
judgment, it is said, is void, because of the death of Hazard L.
Baldwin before its rendition, there being no suggestion of his death.
The judgment was voidable, but not void. It was voidable at the
instance of Hazard L. Baldwin's representatives. Until avoided
by proceedings in error by his representatives, it is final both as to
him and as to the other defendants. It is not even voidable by
the other defendants, because, although erroneous, it is not erroneous to their prejudice.
Judgment affirmed.

